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Abstract. State-of-the-art deep learning models are untrustworthy due
to their vulnerability to adversarial examples. Intriguingly, besides sim-
ple adversarial perturbations, there exist Universal Adversarial Pertur-
bations (UAPs), which are input-agnostic perturbations that lead to mis-
classification of majority inputs. The main target of existing adversarial
examples (including UAPs) is to change primarily the correct Top-1 pre-
dicted class by the incorrect one, which does not guarantee changing the
Top-k prediction. However, in many real-world scenarios, dealing with
digital data, Top-k predictions are more important. We propose an effec-
tive geometry-inspired method of computing Top-k adversarial examples
for any k. We evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency by comparing it with
other adversarial example crafting techniques. Based on this method, we
propose Top-k Universal Adversarial Perturbations, image-agnostic tiny
perturbations that cause true class to be absent among the Top-k pre-
diction. We experimentally show that our approach outperforms baseline
methods and even improves existing techniques of generating UAPs.
Keywords: adversarial examples, deep learning
1 Introduction
Besides revolutionizing wide range of tasks, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are
intriguingly found to be brittle to imperceptible well-designed noises to input,
also known as adversarial examples [30,11,5]. These malicious perturbations are
carefully crafted in order to fool the DNN with perturbed input. They may
attempt to target a specific class to be a prediction (targeted attack), or to yield
a class any different from the true (untargeted attack). Advances of adversarial
perturbations found potential vulnerabilities of practical DNNs applications in
self-driving cars [9,12], speech recognition [2,6], face identification [28,18]. These
security issues have attracted a lot of attention to adversarial examples.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [23] proposed an efficient way of constructing ad-
versarial perturbations - DeepFool, which finds a perturbation in the direction
towards closest linearly approximated decision boundary. Based on DeepFool, in
[22] it was discovered a way of constructing small input-agnostic universal ad-
versarial perturbations (UAPs), that cause neural networks to make mistakes on
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most of inputs. The existence and transferability of such perturbations show the
risks of DNNs deployment in real-world scenarios, as adversaries can straight-
forwardly compute and exploit them in a malicious manner.
In many real-world DNN applications that work with digital data, such as
computer vision cloud APIs (Google Cloud Vision, Amazon Rekognition, IBM
Watson Visual Recognition, Microsoft Azure Computer Vision, Clarifai), recom-
mendation systems, web search engines, Top-k prediction is more important and
meaningful, since user usually gets Top-k classes corresponding to a particular
request, and some of them are difficult to discriminate. However, existing tech-
niques of computing adversarial examples (including UAPs) target fooling the
Top-1 prediction of DNNs, and does not guarantee fooling the Top-k prediction,
sometimes even just swapping classes from the Top-2 prediction. We attempt
to fill this gap and extend DeepFool [23] and UAP [22] to the case of a Top-k
adversary. Visual illustration of a Top-k UAP is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Visual illustration of Top-k Universal Adversarial Perturbation. Single pertur-
bation of small norm (here, `∞−bound is 10) makes true class of initial images to be
outside of Top-k prediction of perturbed images for majority of cases.
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Main contributions of this paper are following:
– We propose kFool - a geometrically-motivated approach to efficiently com-
pute a Top-k adversarial perturbation to an image that makes the true class
to be absent among the Top-k prediction. Inspired by the idea of DeepFool,
we ’linearize’ decision boundaries using Taylor expansion and find the so-
called ”bisection” direction that simultaneously bring closer data point to k
nearest decision boundaries.
– We show effectiveness and efficiency of kFool, by demonstrating that it is
possible to construct a Top-k adversarial perturbation of a small magni-
tude, bounded either in `2 or `∞, and compare it to popular existing Top-1
adversarial perturbations crafting techniques.
– We propose Top-k Universal Adversarial Perturbations (kUAPs), based on
kFool, that extends the idea of UAPs, which was based on DeepFool, to
Top-k prediction.
– We experimentally show that kUAPs outperform baseline methods and even
improve existing techniques of generating UAPs on standard ILSVRC2012
dataset.
2 Background
Here, we describe theoretical preliminaries of adversarial examples, needed before
we introduce our method. Given an input x ∈ Rm and a neural network classifier
F : Rm → RC for C discrete classes, the adversarial perturbation (which we will
also call Top-1 adversarial perturbation) for an input x, as found in [30], is a
specific noise v ∈ Rm, such that the norm of the perturbation is small, ‖v‖ ≤ ,
and the perturbed image is missclassified, or formally:
arg maxF (x) 6= arg maxF (x+ v). (1)
If the number of classes is larger than k, one can also introduce Top-k adversarial
perturbation, i.e. the original class is outside of the largest k components of
F (x+ v):
arg maxF (x) /∈ arg sort F (x+ v)[: k] (2)
It should be mentioned that for images, the new input x + v should also
satisfy constraints on pixel values. One often looks for the optimal perturbation:
i.e. the perturbation that satisfies (1) or (2) and has minimal norm. The classical
work of Goodfellow et al. [11] proposed a single-step way to craft an adversarial
perturbation with small `∞−bound value of  for a given input x with a true
label y, called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), using backpropagation of
a continuous loss function L (typically, cross-entropy) between the prediction
F (x) and the label y:
xadv = x+  sign(∇xL(F (x), y)), (3)
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Our work is built upon the DeepFool method of Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [23],
where an elegant geometry-inspired way of calculation of an adversarial per-
turbation in the approximate direction of the nearest decision boundary was
presented. Suppose, we have a linear binary classifier and the current point x0,
and would like to construct the optimal adversarial perturbation. It can be easily
seen, that the minimal norm of an adversarial perturbation is the distance to the
separating plane wTx+ b = 0 of the binary classifier. This distance is computed
as:
r = −|f(x0)|‖w‖22
w, (4)
where f(x) = wTx+ b, and its magnitude is d = ‖r‖2 = |f(x0)|‖w‖2 . Equation (4) is
convenient since it can be extended to an arbitrary binary classifier with a deci-
sion boundary f , and also to the multi-class case. For an arbitrary differentiable
decision boundary it is sufficient to see, that first-order Taylor expansion allows
to approximate as:
w = ∇xf, (5)
and to generalize to the multi-class case, one can use the “one-vs-all” classifica-
tion scheme.
Specifically, for an input x0 and i-th decision boundary, the corresponding
function is fi(x) = Ftrue(x)− Fi(x) and wi = ∇xFtrue(x)−∇xFi(x), where Fi
is the output logit of a neural network corresponding to the class i. Thus, the
minimal `2 perturbation r needed to fool this linearly approximated classifier for
x0 can be computed as:
c = arg min
i6=true
|Fi(x0)− Ftrue(x0)|
‖∇xFi(x0)−∇xFtrue(x0)‖2 (6)
r =
|Fc(x0)− Ftrue(x0)|
‖∇xFc(x0)−∇xFtrue(x0)‖22
(∇xFc(x0)−∇xFtrue(x0)) (7)
In the same manner, the minimal `∞ perturbation to the nearest decision
boundary can be computed as:
c = arg min
i6=true
|Fi(x0)− Ftrue(x0)|
‖∇xFi(x0)−∇xFtrue(x0)‖1 (8)
r =
|Fc(x0)− Ftrue(x0)|
‖∇xFc(x0)−∇xFtrue(x0)‖1 sign(∇xFc(x0)−∇xFtrue(x0)) (9)
Since the linear approximation is a first-order Taylor approximation and may
deviate from the real decision boundary, iterations are required: the original
image is perturbed, new perturbation vector is computed and so on. However,
only few iterations are needed to reach an incorrect class.
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3 Main idea: kFool method
DeepFool quickly reaches the incorrect class. However, our target is different: we
need to construct the Top-k perturbation, i.e. perturb the initial image such that
the true class is outside of not the Top-1 prediciton, but the Top-k. DeepFool
may not give such a result, however, by considering k decision boundaries we can
construct such a perturbation in the same computational cost as the DeepFool.
For simplicity, we first consider k=2 closest linearized decision boundaries
(see Fig. 2). Originally, moving along DeepFool direction (r1 or r2, which are
opposite to corresponding w1 and w2) we, while bringing closer one boundary,
unfortunately might move away data point from another. Thus, to efficiently
attack Top-k prediction, one needs to find a direction which brings data point
closer to all k (here, k = 2) boundaries (green region in Fig. 2). The most logical
direction that simultaneously brings a data point closer to both boundaries is
the central direction that splits green region into equal halves. This direction is
also perpendicular to a bisector line of an exterior angle between the boundaries.
So, instead of finding a perturbation as a vector (r1 or r2), orthogonal to the
nearest decision boundaries, we propose to look for the perturbation as a vector,
orthogonal to the bisector line of the exterior angle between the boundaries (rb,
which is opposite to the bisector ’s vector wb). It should be noted, that wb is also
a bisector direction of an angle between boundary vectors w1 and w2.
Fig. 2. A geometric illustration of a single step of kFool for k=2. The data point O is
inside the true class region surrounded by k=2 closest linearized decision boundaries
with incorrect classes. a1 and a2 are auxiliary planes passing through O, parallel to the
decision boundaries. The perturbation applied to the purple region moves away point
O from both boundaries. The perturbation applied to the blue regions brings closer the
point O to one boundary (DeepFool), but moves away from another. The perturbation
applied to the green region brings the point O closer to both boundaries (kFool).
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It is not difficult to show that the formula of computing parameters (wb and
bb) of the bisector line between the two lines f1 = w
T
1 x+ b1 and f2 = w
T
2 x+ b2
is:
wb =
w1
‖w1‖2 +
w2
‖w2‖2
1
‖w1‖2 +
1
‖w2‖2
,
bb =
b1
‖w1‖2 +
b2
‖w2‖2
1
‖w1‖2 +
1
‖w2‖2
.
(10)
A numerically stable way for computing rb, is to calculate fb = w
T
b x+ bb =
f1
‖w1‖2+
f2
‖w2‖2
1
‖w1‖2+
1
‖w2‖2
.
To extend this idea for Top-k prediction (k> 2), without loss of general-
ization, we can simply increase the number of summation terms both in the
numerator and the denominator. Using the notations and formulas for fi and wi
from DeepFool, our proposed `2-bounded perturbation has the following form:
rb =
∣∣∣∣ k∑
i=1
Fp[i](x)−Ftrue(x)
‖∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖2
∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥ k∑
i=1
∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)
‖∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖2
∥∥∥∥2
2
(
k∑
i=1
∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)
‖∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖2
)
, (11)
where p is an array of indices of sorted values of F (x) in descending order.
Similarly to DeepFool, it might be not enough to use a perturbation only
once to reach the satisfactory condition (true class is absent among largest k
predictions), thus we do a few iterations for that (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 kFool
INPUT: k, Image x, classifier F with logits {F1, . . . , FC} corresponding to C classes
1: true← arg max
j
(Fj(x))
2: p← arg sort(F (x)) . In descending order
3: r← 0
4: while true in p[: k] do
5: wb ← 0
6: fb ← 0
7: for i = 2 to k + 1 do:
8: wb ← wb + ∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖2
9: fb ← fb + Fp[i](x)−Ftrue(x)‖∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖2
10: end for
11: r← r + |fb|‖wb‖22wb
12: p← arg sort(F (x+r)) . In descending order
13: end while
OUTPUT: Top-k Adversarial Perturbation r
Geometry-Inspired Top-k Adversarial Perturbations 7
Extension of (11) to `∞ is straightforward, as we follow DeepFool’s extension
in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9):
rb =
∣∣∣∣ k∑
i=1
Fp[i](x)−Ftrue(x)
‖∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖2
∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥ k∑
i=1
∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)
‖∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖2
∥∥∥∥
1
sign
(
k∑
i=1
∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)
‖∇xFp[i](x)−∇xFtrue(x)‖2
)
(12)
3.1 Experiments with kFool
Here, we show that it is possible to efficiently find a Top-k adversarial pertur-
bation for a given image using kFool. We compare kFool perturbations with
DeepFool [23] and FGSM [11].
Fig. 3. Examples of kFool (k = 5), DeepFool and FGSM adversarial perturbations.
For the kFool-perturbed image, true class is absent among Top-k predictions, while for
the image perturbed by DeepFool [23] or FGSM [11] true class is present among Top-k
prediction, which shows the superiority of kFool. Moreover, visually kFool produces
perturbation even smaller than FGSM and comparable to DeepFool, however latter
two use more simple task statement.
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For the experiments we use LeNet [21] architecture for MNIST test dataset,
ResNet-18 [14] for CIFAR-10 test dataset and ILSVRC2012 [8] validation dataset.
To show the effectiveness of kFool (k = 5), we compare the Top-k fooling rate
with DeepFool [23] and FGSM (90% Top-1 fooling rate) [11] and show that our
method is quite effective. Results are shown in Table 1. The metric to compare
fooling rates is:
FRk[X] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1argmaxF (xi) /∈ arg sortFi(xi+v(xi))[:k] (13)
Table 1. Top-5 fooling rate for different adversarial perturbation generation methods
Method LeNet(MNIST) ResNet-18(CIFAR-10) ResNet-18(ILSVRC2012)
DeepFool 0.0 0.0 0.0
FGSM(90%) 0.1125 0.2772 0.8673
kFool 1.0 1.0 1.0
Figure 3 illustrates examples of a kFool perturbation for k = 5, DeepFool
perturbation, and FGSM perturbation. It can be observed that kFool produces
a hardly perceptible adversarial noise of a small norm. To quantify the efficiency
of kFool, we compare it to existing techniques of generating adversarial examples:
FGSM [11] and DeepFool [23]. Following [23], the metric to compare results for
a dataset D is:
ρp =
1
|D|
∑
x∈D
‖r(x)‖p
‖x‖p (14)
Since FGSM targets the `∞-bounded perturbation, we use the `∞ version
of DeepFool and kFool for fair comparison (see Tables 2, 3, 4). In the case of
DeepFool and kFool we reach our desired fooling condition (either Top-1 or Top-
k) for 100% of images, however for FGSM increasing  even to very large values,
we cannot reach 100% fooling rate. For this reason, we use such values of  for
FGSM, that guarantee the fooling for some specific number of images.
Table 2. Norms of perturbation generated by kFool, FGSM [11] and DeepFool [23] for
LeNet architecture on MNIST test dataset.
Metric kFool (`∞) DeepFool (`∞) FGSM (90%) FGSM (99%)
ρ2 0.6659 0.3277 0.55979 0.63
ρ∞ 0.2456 0.1116 0.1836 0.2460
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Table 3. Norms of perturbation generated by kFool, FGSM [11] and DeepFool [23] for
ResNet-18 [14] architecture on CIFAR-10 test dataset.
Metric kFool (`∞) DeepFool (`∞) FGSM (85%) FGSM (90%)
ρ2 0.027881 0.01224 0.25253 0.35355
ρ∞ 0.01646 0.00611 0.10950 0.1533
Table 4. Norms of perturbation generated by kFool, FGSM [11] and DeepFool [23] for
ResNet-18 [14] architecture on ILSVRC2012 validation dataset.
Metric kFool (`∞) DeepFool (`∞) FGSM (90%) FGSM (95%)
ρ2 0.00612 0.00244 0.00954 0.04576
ρ∞ 0.00334 0.00117 0.00422 0.0201
Based to the quantitative results in Tables 2, 3, 4, it can be seen that kFool
generates very efficient perturbation both in terms of `2 and `∞ norms. kFool
either reach the same norms as FGSM, or outperforms it, and has norms com-
parable to DeepFool.
4 kUAP
Here, we describe the method to generate Top-k Universal Adversarial Perturba-
tions (kUAPs) that fools Top-k prediction for most of images, using previously
described kFool algorithm.
UAP [22] solves the problem in Equation (2), but for most of images. To find
such a universal direction that fools majority of images, it was proposed to apply
DeepFool [23] in an iterative manner over dataset of images, as it finds a small
Top-1 adversarial perturbation efficiently. To satisfy the constraint of smallness
of noise, at each time they project a new perturbation to the `p-ball, suitable
for that.
Inspired by the existence of such directions, we extend the idea of generating
UAPs with kFool, to find a perturbation, mere addition of which to most of nat-
ural images makes their true classes to be outside of Top-k predictions. Formally,
the goal of kUAP is to find a noise v that satisfies two following conditions:
1. Px∼µ [arg maxi(Fi(x)) /∈ arg sort(Fi(x+ v))[: k]] ≥ 1− δ
2. ‖v‖p ≤ 
In the above criteria, µ is the distribution of natural images from which x is
drawn, and this distribution is hugely varied.  is the magnitude of `p norm on
which the noise v is constrained. The arg sort(Fi(·))[: k] operator gets the first k
indices of sorted output logits Fi (i.e. the Top-k prediction). The parameter 1−δ
quantifies the desired fooling rate — i.e. the fraction of images Top-k prediction
of which should be fooled.
10 N. Tursynbek et al.
Algorithm. Given a dataset X = {x1, . . . ,xN} ∼ µ, our proposed algorithm
kUAP searches for a such direction ‖v‖p ≤ , the addition of which to (1 − δ)
fraction of images makes their true label (arg maxi(Fi(x))) to be outside of Top-k
prediction (arg sort(Fi(x + v))[: k]). Following [22], we propose to apply kFool,
which finds normal vector to the ”bisector of an exterior angle between the
nearest k decision boundaries” (see Algorithm 1), iteratively over data samples
from X. The illustrative schematic of the procedure is demonstrated in Fig. 4.
First, all images are super-imposed into one starting point and v is initialized as
a zero vector. At each iteration i, algorithm finds kFool direction ∆vi for a given
data point xi+v, which fools the Top-k prediction for the current image xi, and
updates the current universal perturbation v simply by v = P(v + ∆vi). The
projector operator P controls the criteria ‖v‖p ≤ . For example, for p =∞:
P(v) = Clip(v,−, ) (15)
To improve the quality of kUAP the iterative procedure over X needs to be
repeated several times till desired universal fooling rate (1− δ) is reached, as in
[22] (see Algorithm 2). The universal fooling rate for Top-k prediction is similar
to Eq. (13), except the fact that v, here, does not depend on x:
UFRk[X] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1argmaxF (xi) /∈ arg sortFi(xi+v)[:k] (16)
Fig. 4. Schematic illustration of kUAP procedure. Data points x1, x2, x3 from different
classes (with decision regions R1,R2,R3) are super-imposed. Then, iteratively kFool is
applied that sends points in the direction of the bissector of the exterior angle between
k nearest boundaries.
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Algorithm 2 kUAP
INPUT: k, `p-bound , fooling rate δ, dataset X = {x1, . . . ,xN}, classifier F
1: v← 0
2: while UFRk[X] ≤ 1− δ do
3: for xi ∈ X do:
4: if arg maxF (xi) ∈ arg sort(F (xi + v))[: k] then:
5: ∆vi = kFool(k,xi + v, F ) . Algorithm 1
6: v← P(v +∆vi)
7: end if
8: end for
9: end while
OUTPUT: Top-k Universal Adversarial Perturbation v
5 Experiments with kUAP
We now describe experimental results of kUAP.
For our experiments with ILSVRC2012 [8] dataset we used the following pre-
trained architectures: VGG-16 [29], ResNet-18 [14], MobileNetV2 [27]. They all
have good Top-1 and Top-5 accuracies.
To generate Top-k universal adversarial perturbation we use 10000 images
from validation set of ILSVRC2012 [8] dataset, such that each of 1000 classes are
represented by 10 samples, as the train set. The remaining 40000 images from
ILSVRC2012 validation set is used as the test set. We constraint the universal
perturbation v by `∞ norm bounded by  = 10, which is significantly smaller
than the average `∞ norm of the validation set: 1|D|
∑
x∈D
‖x‖∞ ≈ 250. These cri-
teria produces quasi-imperceptible Top-k Universal Adversarial Perturbations.
Examples of such perturbed images from test set are shown in Fig. 5. In Fig.
5 one single Top-3 universal adversarial perturbation, generated using kUAP
algorithm for MobileNetV2 [27] architecture, was added to natural images.
Table 5. Fooling rates of different architectures
Classifier Metric UAP kUAP
ResNet-18
Top-1 0.772475 0.77890
Top-2 0.7015 0.71090
Top-3 0.6598 0.67195
VGG-16
Top-1 0.790925 0.823125
Top-2 0.726525 0.766075
Top-3 0.688175 0.731975
MobileNetV2
Top-1 0.885050 0.915400
Top-2 0.837275 0.879125
Top-3 0.803325 0.854975
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Fig. 5. Examples of perturbed images with a single quasi imperceptible Top-k Univer-
sal Adversarial Perturbation generated for MobileNetV2 and k = 3. Under each image
the wrong Top-3 prediction is shown, when the perturbation is added.
We also generate Top-k Universal Adversarial Perturbations using kUAP for
different deep neural networks. Fig. 6 shows generated kUAPs (k = 3) corre-
sponding to ResNet-18 [14], VGG-16 [29], MobilenetV2 [27] for ILSVRC2012
dataset. Similarly to [22], these perturbations contain visually structured pat-
terns, which might reveal some interesting information about DNNs. We report
their fooling rates on test set and compare to UAP in Table 5. Even UAP’s target
is not Top-k prediction, it shows good fooling rate, however kUAP outperforms.
It is well-known that the UAPs [22] have property to transfer across networks,
which make them ’doubly-universal’. It is interesting to check if proposed kUAPs
are also transferable. It is expected that they are more network-specific, which is
indeed confirmed by Table 6, however, the constructed perturbations give fooling
rate sufficiently higher than random perturbation.
Table 6. Cross-network transferability of kUAPs. The rows indicate the network for
which the kUAP is computed, and the columns indicate the network for which the
fooling rate is reported.
ResNet-18 VGG-16 MobileNetV2
ResNet-18 0.67195 0.2688 0.303975
VGG-16 0.34475 0.731975 0.4211
MobileNetV2-18 0.2465 0.14995 0.854975
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(a) ResNet-18 (b) VGG-16 (c) MobileNetV2
Fig. 6. Result of kUAP to different deep neural networks
Fig. 7. Dependency of test set fooling rate on the size of training set
It should be mentioned that Top-k Universal Adversarial Perturbations shown
in Fig. 6 are not unique perturbations and there are a numerous perturbations
satisfying above criteria. The diversity for example might be reached by chang-
ing the training batch of images, however, it is interesting to see how fooling rate
depends on the size of training set. To explore that we select 1, 2, 3, 4 samples
from each class from previous training set (10000 images) which corresponds
to 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 size values and construct universal perturbation using
UAP [22] and our proposed kUAP. We test all perturbations on the same test
set of 40000 images that was used before. Fig. 7 demonstrates the Top-3 accu-
racy for UAP and kUAP using different sizes of training set. As it can be seen,
kUAP generates much stronger Top-k universal adversarial perturbations than
UAP [22].
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6 Related Work
In the task of image classification, class ambiguity is a common problem espe-
cially when the number of classes increases. Thus, it makes sense to allow making
k guesses and it motivates to evaluate classifiers based on the Top-k error, in-
stead of the typical Top-1 error. This problem is computationally easier to solve
(scales better), and produces the better accuracy score. Several Top-k losses were
suggested recently to yield the better Top-k accuracy score [20,4,10,7].
Initially found in [30], adversarial examples have gained significant attention.
Goodfellow et.al [11] first proposed a single-step way of constructing adversarial
perturbations, and its iterative extension was proposed in [19]. DeepFool [23] is
an efficient geometric approach of finding very small adversarial perturbations.
After it was shown in [22] that, using DeepFool, it is possible to construct UAPs,
several other methods were proposed [17,31,25,24,13]. In [25,24], it was proposed
to craft data-free UAPs, using different objectives. In [17], it was proposed to
use (p, q)−singular vectors to craft UAPs with a few data samples. In [31], it
was proposed to attack images with UAPs in a black-box manner, using Fourier
basis. In [13], generative models were used to construct UAPs. UAPs is not the
problem in the image classification task only and were generalized to semantic
segmentation [15], text classification [3], speech recognition [26] and audio classi-
fication [1]. Recently, Jia et al. [16] provided tight bounds of certified robustness
for a Top-k adversarial perturbation in `2 norm, however existing adversarial
perturbations are mostly concerned only with Top-1 prediction. In [32] ordered
Top-k attack was suggested, however, their method relies on C&W attack [5],
which is not an efficient way of constructing adversarial perturbation, which re-
quires a lot of time. To the best of our knowledge, no prior method of efficient
constructing Top-k adversarial examples and Top-k UAPs was proposed.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an efficient geometry-inspired way of constructing
Top-k adversarial perturbations and Top-k universal adversarial perturbations.
We found our method as an efficient and effective technique. Our method kFool
outperforms existing techniques in Top-k fooling rate and finds Top-k adversarial
perturbations of small norm. Our method kUAP outperforms UAP both in Top-
1 and Top-k fooling rates.
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